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Abstract
Why, in some urban communities, do rich and poor households cohabit while, in others, we observe
sorting by income? To answer this question I develop a two-community general equilibrium framework
of school quality, residential choice and tax decision with probabilistic voting. The model predicts that
in highly unequal societies in which households segregate by schooling, low- and high-income households
choose to live in the same community. When there is less inequality, we observe the typical sorting by
income across communities. The theoretical model suggests that the effect of inequality on the quality of
public schooling is ambiguous and depends on the relative endowments of housing in the two communi-
ties. When inequality increases, if housing in the community where rich and poor households cohabit is
affordable, then an inflow of high-income middle class households towards this community emerges. As
a consequence, inequality negatively impacts the quality of public schooling due to an ends-against-the-
middle coalition that pushes tax rates down.
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21 Introduction
A striking characteristic of U.S. metropolitan areas is the concentration of poverty close
to inner cities. Data from the U.S. Census show that 17.6% of the population in the
inner cities of all U.S. metropolitan areas had an income below poverty level in 1999,
as against only 8.4% of the suburban population1. According to the 2012 American
Community Survey (ACS), in 2012 the share of the inner city population living in
poverty was as high as 19.7%2. However, in some urban areas, the city center is also
home to high-income households who, not surprisingly, may co-reside in the same area
with low-income households.
The cohabitation of heterogeneous income groups in the same community, in particu-
lar in the same school district, can have important implications for income redistribution,
access to high quality education, public policies, political decisions and socio-economic
opportunities. A central issue is to understand the consequences of the emergence of
mixed-income communities, since the presence of different income groups within the
same community may create segregation in terms of access to high quality schooling,
thereby hindering the upward mobility of poor households. Two sets of questions arise
when mixed-income communities emerge. First, why do some urban areas show sorting
by income at community level while, in others, rich and poor households cohabit? How
does this difference relate to school districts’ quality of public schooling and enrollment
in private schools? Are public schools in communities composed mainly of middle-
income households qualitatively better than those in mixed-income districts? Second,
does income inequality impact residential choices and community segregation?
1Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census, Summary File 3. The data also point to declining
poverty in inner cities since 1990.
2In contrast, only 11.2% of the suburban population had an income below the poverty threshold
during the same year. See Gabe (2013) for a report on poverty in the United States, Partridge and
Rickman (2006) for a through analysis of poverty trends in America. See also Berube and Frey (2002)
for an analysis of poverty rates in the 102 largest U.S. metropolitan areas based on the 2000 Census,
and Berube and Kneebone (2006) for a similar study based on the 2000 Census and 2005 ACS.
3In this paper I develop a general equilibrium model of private/public school choice,
political decisions and endogenous residential choice to address these questions. I fo-
cus on a two-community economy in which housing market and fiscal policies interact
with school and residential location choices, and therefore with the quality of public
education. The framework I provide involves an economy composed of two communities
with homogeneous land and fixed boundaries, which can be interpreted as two different
school districts characterized by the same level of housing quality. Parents have to de-
cide which district to live in and which type of school to send their children to, choosing
between a tax-financed public school or a private school financed by tuition fees. The
quality of public education in each district is determined by the amount of spending per
student financed through property taxes on housing value3. Moreover, a probabilistic
voting process in each community determines the local tax rate and, therefore, public
education spending.
The theoretical model developed in this paper is aimed at identifying the analytical
conditions under which an inter-community political equilibrium with segregation and
income mixing exists. In the income mixing equilibrium, poor and rich households
cohabit in the same community and send their children respectively to public and private
schools. The other community is composed of middle-income households who choose the
local public school for their children4. An income mixing equilibrium is found to exist
if and only if income dispersion is sufficiently high. If the conditions for this particular
type of equilibrium are not satisfied, then the model with probabilistic voting predicts
a perfect stratification across communities according to income. In this case, the fully
public regime prevails, and the community with lower (higher) quality public education
3While I assume proportional income tax rather than property value tax, the model predicts the
same qualitative results.
4From a political perspective, the equilibrium that features this particular configuration supports
the result provided in Epple and Romano (1996) in a single community model: a coalition of rich and
poor households will be opposed by a coalition of middle-income households. This outcome, namely
’the ends against the middle’, implies that high- and low-income households vote for low taxation and
public school spending, while middle-income households vote for a high level of redistribution.
4is populated by households with low (high) income.
One of the main predictions of the model concentrates on the effect of inequality on
endogenous residential location choices in a model that includes simultaneously: public
versus private education choice, two-community structure with independent local gov-
ernment, a competitive housing market within each community, a property tax rate
based on housing value, a probabilistic voting mechanism rather than majority choice.
Since the early 70’s, U.S. metropolitan areas have experienced an increase in income
inequality, driven largely by income growth in the top half of the income distribution5.
Increase in inequality has been accompanied by a change in the population composi-
tion of some inner cities, with poor households replaced by high-income middle class
households6. Similarly, the theoretical analysis in this paper suggests an endogenous
population reallocation as a consequence of inequality.
The main theoretical contributions of the paper are the following. First, while the
majority choice model cannot generate an equilibrium with income mixing if indifference
curves have a slope which is non-increasing in income, the probabilistic voting alternative
can, under particular conditions. Second, the effect of inequality on residential location
decisions and, therefore, on public spending per student, is ambiguous and depends on
the relative endowments of housing and prices in the two communities. An increase in
inequality leads to an influx of middle-income households in the mixed-income district
when the relative supply of housing is sufficiently large. As a consequence, the theoretical
model predicts that inequality negatively impacts the quality of public schooling due to
an ends-against-the-middle coalition that pushes tax rates down. By contrast, when
the relative supply of housing in the community with income mixing is sufficiently low,
inequality decreases the tax rate but increases public spending per pupil. In this case,
5See Piketty and Saez (2003), Corocan and Evans (2010). According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
inequality in the U.S. as measured by the pre-tax Gini coefficient at country level increased from 0.394
in 1970 to 0.469 in 2010.
6See Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009). The authors show how high income and low income households
locate within a city, providing a new model of the gentrification process in some U.S. cities.
5high-income households do not move towards the mixed-income community and the
model ends up with one of the results in de la Croix and Doepke (2009): higher inequality
is positively associated with public spending per student7.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 summarizes the relevant literature and
highlights the contribution of this paper. Section 3 develops the theoretical model, also
discussing the conditions necessary for an equilibrium with income mixing as well as for a
perfect income stratification equilibrium. Section 4 focuses on the effect of inequality on
the equilibrium vector of fiscal policies and public education spending. Section 5 presents
an empirical analysis on the relationship between the existence of mixed/middle income
school districts and public school quality in the U.S. States of Arizona and Illinois.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper builds on two strands of the literature. The first one deals with the emer-
gence of mixed-income communities in presence of private school alternatives. Bearse
et al. (2001), Martinez-Mora (2006), Hanushek et al. (2011) have developed general
equilibrium models of community choice and school competition. As in the present pa-
per, these studies analyze the impact of private education options on residential location
decisions, as well as the political economy of public education provisions.
Bearse et al. (2001) study central versus local school finance in a dynamic Tiebout
economy with private alternatives and majority voting. In contrast to the standard
Tiebout model, the authors find that communities are not perfectly stratified by in-
7The literature studying the effect of inequality on income redistribution has produced ambiguous
results. As also observed by Arcalean and Schiopu (2016), in Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Persson
and Tabellini (1994), higher inequality is associated to more redistribution. By contrast, other papers
find that redistribution is weaker in more unequal societies. See, for instance, Alesina et al. (1999),
Luttmer (2001). Along these lines, Di Gioacchino and Sabani (2009) show that the greater the wealth
inequality compared to initial income inequality, the less egalitarian the incidence of public education
expenditure will be.
6come, but that rich and poor households choose to cohabit in one community, while
middle-income households live in another location. This particular segregated equilib-
rium is found assuming a CES utility function with elasticity of substitution between
consumption and children’s education lower than one8.
Along these lines, Martinez-Mora (2006) provides a general equilibrium model with
two communities in which local public schools coexist with competing private schools.
These communities are interpreted as the urban area and the suburbs of a city. Each
community finances public education by imposing a proportional property tax on the
value of housing. Assuming that an urban area offers lower quality public schooling, the
author uses a computational version of the model to construct examples where multiple
equilibria may exist. More precisely, the resulting equilibria will be of one of two types:
urban trap or urban mixing equilibrium. In an urban trap equilibrium, middle-income
households live in the urban area and opt out of the public system by enrolling their
children in low quality private schools, while higher income households prefer to use
the local high quality public schools9. An urban mixing equilibrium is defined as an
equilibrium in which poor and rich households cohabit in the urban area and segregate
by schooling, while middle class households live in the suburbs and send their children
to the local public school10.
Hanushek et al. (2011), study how the existence of a private school option affects
the demand for public school quality. The authors develop a framework that merges
the Tiebout and urban residential location models. In this particular location model,
8This is equivalent to assume a preference parameter σ larger than one implying a slope of indifference
curves strictly increasing in income.
9In a urban trap equilibrium households from the top income classes may also acquire elite private
schooling in the urban area rather than use the suburban public school. See Martinez-Mora (2006).
10While the main contribution of the paper by Martinez-Mora is the analysis of the urban trap
equilibrium, my work concentrates on the emergence of an urban mixing equilibrium in which middle
class households live in the more expensive suburb and send their children to high quality public schools,
while poor and rich households cohabit in the urban area and segregate by schooling. In section 3 I
will show why an urban trap equilibrium with non-elite private schools cannot be an equilibrium in my
model.
7households differ by their earnings, as well as in their preferences on education. Taxes
are determined by majority vote and income mixing emerges in equilibrium. However,
the equilibrium of this model can only be calculated numerically. The computational
model shows how the link between spending and quality of public schools is significantly
modified in the presence of private schools. The mechanism is primarily based on to the
peer composition in both the public and private schools.
On the other strand, the education financial literature, suggests that mechanisms
other than majority voting, such as probabilistic voting, might offer a different descrip-
tion of the aggregation of preferences11. De la Croix and Doepke (2009), Bernasconi
and Profeta (2012), Dottori et al. (2013), Arcalean and Schiopu (2016) introduce prob-
abilistic voting in the context of education and school choice. In their pioneering work,
de la Croix and Doepke (2009) develop a single district economy in which the tax rate
and the quality of public education are determined via probabilistic voting. They show
that households perfectly segregate by education. This segregation pattern is driven by
the fact that parents prefer to enroll their children in private schools when these schools
provide higher quality education than what is provided in the public system12.
My paper builds on these two different approaches. The objective is to construct a
’hybrid’ approach able to merge the community choice model, in which private educa-
tion options are available, with a political mechanism that does not depend solely on
the preferences of the median voter, but rather on the whole distribution of voters’ pref-
erences. This approach allows me to extend the theoretical contribution of de la Croix
and Doepke (2009), developing a fully tractable two-community model able to predict
11Probabilistic voting models were first introduced by Lindbeck and Weibull (1993). Glomm et al.
(2011) note that even though these models could ease existence problems, whether they provide a better
representation of reality remains an open question.
12More precisely, they examine how the quality of public education is affected by the presence of
private schools. The choice between public and private education has already been studied by many
authors: Stiglitz (1974), de la Croix and Doepke (2004), in a single district economy, Gutierrez and
Tanaka (2009), Estevan (2013) in a setting where parents can send children to work instead of educate
them.
8an equilibrium with income mixing. In particular, my paper provides an important the-
oretical extension of their work that captures the interaction between housing demand,
school quality and tax decisions in a context in which alternative locations are available.
Indeed, I assume a two-community model in which the housing market interacts with
both school and residential location decisions13.
In this set-up I find analytical solutions for a segregated equilibrium in which poor
and rich households cohabit in one community while middle-income households live in an-
other community. In particular, my model predicts that this segregated equilibrium with
income mixing exists only if income distribution is not sufficiently compressed. However,
if the preferred education level varies little in the population and income distribution is
sufficiently compressed, there is perfect income stratification across communities and a
fully public regime prevails.
3 The Model
In this section I develop a general equilibrium model of two communities with fixed
boundaries in which housing market and fiscal policies interact with the quality of public
education, school choices and residential decisions.
3.1 Theoretical Assumptions
The economy is populated by a continuum of households of measure one. Each household
consists of one adult and one school-aged child. Adults are differentiated by their income
endowment x, where x is the wage that an adult can obtain in the labor market. I focus
on a uniform distribution of income over the interval [µ−σ;µ+σ] for positive µ > σ > 014.
13Moreover, in my paper, public education is financed through property taxes on housing value rather
than through income tax.
14The uniform distribution is chosen for simplicity. Accordingly, the associated density function is
given by f(x) = 0 for x < µ − σ and x > µ + σ and f(x) = 12σ for 0 < µ − σ ≤ x ≤ µ + σ. In a
recent paper, Arcalean and Schiopu (2016) assume that income is distributed according to a Pareto
9Households’ preferences are represented by a utility function U(h, z). I follow de la
Croix and Doepke (2009) in assuming a logarithmic utility function. Households have
identical preferences on the quality of their children’s education, z, and on the private
good, h, taken here as housing consumption. The assumption that utility depends
only on housing consumption and children’s schooling quality simplifies the analysis
and allows me to obtain analytical solutions15. Education can be provided by public
and private schools that are mutually exclusive and use the same technology to offer
educational services16. Parents may choose to educate their offspring either in a public
school, z = q, where q denotes the schooling quality, or in a private school, z = e, where
e represents education spending in the private market.
Public schools follow a residence-based admission policy: households living in a com-
munity use the local public school. Each community imposes an ad valorem tax on
housing to finance the public education system. The tax rate, τ , and therefore the
amount of public spending on education, are determined by a political vote by residents
of the community. In addition to property taxes on housing value, parents have to pay
tuition fees covering the full cost of private education if they decide to opt out of the
public system. A household can consume either public or private school services, but
not both.
I assume that communities impose a proportional property tax, τ , on the value of
housing rather than an income tax because in the U.S., property taxes finance most local
distribution rather than a uniform distribution in order to obtain a more flexible parametrization of the
income distribution.
15If we add a numeraire to the logarithmic utility function, that is U(c, h, z), the qualitative results
of the analysis do not change but the model loses its analytical tractability. For this reason, and as it
is the theoretical purpose of this paper to study the link between school choice and residential location
decisions, this assumption seems reasonable. Another interpretation of this simplifying assumption is
to consider the variables x, q and e as efficient labor quantities, with labor as the numeraire. In other
words, the numeraire is the final good which is used for education spending only. Therefore, if e and q
are interpreted as labor, in the model there are two goods: a numeraire (labor) and houses (with price
p).
16For expositional reasons, quality units are normalized such that the price per unit of private school-
ing is equal to 1.
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government education spending. Actually, local governments find funding for education
through a combination of property and income taxes. Public school systems in the U.S.
are supported by a combination of state, federal and local taxes. However, a substantial
proportion of expenditure on public education is financed at local level by property
taxes. In order to avoid an additional source of taxation that would complicate the
analysis, in this paper I only consider housing value taxation. The ability to opt out
of the public system by choosing private education, a residence-based admission policy
and the hypothesis that public schools are financed through local property taxes are all
assumptions that strongly tie this model to the U.S. school system17.
A household can choose which community to reside in. To keep the analysis simple,
I assume that each community has a fixed amount of homogeneous land from which
housing services are produced through the same constant returns to scale production
function. Land, and therefore housing, are owned by a competitive absentee landlord
to whom households have to pay rent at the market price18. The two communities may
differ in the amount of land within their fixed boundaries. Each community contains a
set of public schools that provide education of identical quality and can be thought of
as school districts19.
Communities are politically independent but economically integrated. As already
observed in Hansen and Kessler (2001), the assumption of political independence between
communities implies that each local government can choose fiscal policies autonomously.
Economic integration excludes barriers to migration or trade, and allows households to
be perfectly mobile among communities at no direct cost. Moreover, I exclude peer group
17As observed by de Bartolome and Ross (2008), an important difference between the U.S. and Europe
is that in Europe there is less variation in the public service level across jurisdictions and less reliance
on property tax.
18Alternatively, I could assume that households are owners and buy land at the market price. See
Hansen and Kessler (2001) for further discussion on the absentee landlord assumption.
19Otherwise consider that there is only one public school per district. It should also be noted that
considering an economy composed of two communities with the same amount of land represents a
particular case of the structure analyzed in this paper.
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effects so that the quality of public education in each school district is only determined by
the amount of spending per pupil financed through property taxes on housing values20.
Public policies are voted through probabilistic voting. Parents have perfect foresight
over the outcome of the political process and, consequently, over the policies adopted
by the local government of each community. Put differently, expectations about school
quality will be realized. Taking fiscal policies as given, households have to choose where
to reside and which type of school to send their children to. Households actually face
four residential/school choices: (i) district 1 and public school, (ii) district 1 and private
school, (iii) district 2 and public school and (iv) district 2 and private school.
Finally, the timing of events follows two stages. In the first stage, each adult simul-
taneously settles in a community, assuming that housing prices endogenously adjust to
equate housing demand and supply, and chooses between free-of-charge public school
and fee-paying private school for his/her child. In the second stage, the adult residents
of each community vote on the property tax rate and public schooling expenditure. All
households have to pay taxes even if they decide to opt out of the public system. The
outcome of the voting process determines the quality of public education in the two
school districts. This timing structure can be justified by observing that public educa-
tion policy can frequently be adjusted through a yearly budget vote, while residential
decisions cannot 21.
3.1.1 Households’ Problem
Households have to make three decisions: they have to choose which community to live
in, they have to decide whether to educate their children in public or in private schools
20See Benabou (1993) and Hanushek et al. (2011) for models with peer group effects.
21The same argument can be found in de la Croix and Doepke (2009). Similarly, they observe that
the choice between public and private education entails substantial switching costs, especially when
education segregation is linked to residential segregation. Notice that results do not change if decision
are taken simultaneously since rational agents have expectations about the quality of public schools.
Results would change if households could decide to enroll their children in private schools after voting,
which would imply an additional derivative in the voting process discussed in the next pages.
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and they have to vote for the level of public funding for education. The problem of the
representative adult agent can be written as follows22:
(1)
 maxh,e U [h, z] = ln[h] + ln[max{q, e}]s.t. ph(1 + τ) = x− e
where p is the net-of-tax housing price and is determined in the competitive hous-
ing market of each community and τ the property tax rate. Substituting the budget
constraint into the objective function, I can rewrite the utility of the representative
household as follows:
(2) u[q, e, x, τ, p] = ln
[
x− e
(1 + τ)p
]
+ ln[max{q, e}]
Parents preferring public education will choose e = 0. Let us define as uq[q, 0, x, τ, p] and
ue[0, e, x, τ, p] the utility of a household respectively choosing public or private schooling
for his/her child. The problem can be written as:
(3)
 maxh u
q[q, 0, x, τ, p] if public education
maxh,e u
e[0, e, x, τ, p] if private education
The solution to this problem is given by:
(4)
 e = 0, h
q = x
(1+τ)p
if public education
e = x
2
, he = x
2p(1+τ)
if private education
with hq (he) as the housing demand under public (private) education choice23. As we
22For simplicity I adopt a logarithmic utility function, but the same results can be obtained with any
utility function representing homothetic preference. It should be noted that in general homotheticity
implies that a fixed share of income is devoted to each good.
23Given Cobb-Douglas preferences, it is clear that when private education is chosen, income is spent
half on education and half on housing.
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can expect, an increase in property value tax rate or in net-of-tax housing prices will
reduce the consumption of housing.
Substituting the optimal households’ choices into the maximization problem allows
us to derive the indirect utility functions of adults choosing public, V q[x, q, p, τ ], or
private, V e[x, p, τ ] education for their children:
(5)

V q[x, q, p, τ ] = ln
[
x
(1+τ)p
]
+ ln[q]
V e[x, p, τ ] = ln
[
x
2(1+τ)p
]
+ ln
[
x
2
]
Lemma 1. Households strictly prefer private education if and only if x > x˜[q] = 4q.
Proof : Using the indirect functions defined in (5), it is easy to verify that V e[x, p, τ ] >
V q[x, q, p, τ ] when x > 4q.
The expected quality of public education will determine the position of the threshold
x˜(q) in the income distribution and the share of children participating in the public
school system. Notice that education quality is a normal good because parents with
higher income demand more of it.
3.1.2 The Political Mechanism
While the theoretical literature on community choice has mainly examined the condi-
tions for income mixing under majority choice24, in this paper I focus on the case in
which public policies are decided through probabilistic voting. In particular, the anal-
ysis follows the general structure of the most recent literature by assuming that the
tax rate and the quality of public education are determined via probabilistic voting in
24See for instance Nechiba (2000), Bearse et al. (2001), Martinez-Mora (2006), Hanushek et al.
(2011).
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which each individual carries the same political weight in the political process25. Fol-
lowing Bearse et al. (2001), I concentrate on the scenario in which both communities
are occupied. Without loss of generality, the authors restrict their analysis to the case
τ1 < τ2 and q1 < q2. These conditions respectively guarantee that households living in
community 2 never choose private education for their children and that community 2 is
not empty. Similarly, my paper aims to analyze the analytical conditions under which
a segregated equilibrium with income mixing might appear when both communities are
occupied. I focus on the case in which gross housing prices pgi = (1 + τi)pi with i ∈ (1, 2)
are such that pg1 < p
g
2, and the quality of public schooling in community 2 is sufficiently
high relative to community 126.
My objective is to characterize an “inter-community equilibrium” (see Section 3.2
for a formal definition) with income-mixing. In this equilibrium, poor individuals, with
revenue below a certain threshold x˜1 and rich individuals, with revenue above x˜2, decide
to cohabit in the same community, while households with income between x˜1 and x˜2
live in another community. Before giving the analytical details of the analysis with
probabilistic voting, I briefly present the equilibrium results under majority choice. A
majority voting equilibrium exists in the model. Given the timing of events and the
assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences, it is straightforward to demonstrate that under
the majority voting rule, all agents choosing public education in one community prefer
the same property tax τ = 1, while agents choosing private education prefer a tax rate
τ = 0. In other words, the majority of agents choosing private or public school for their
children determines the majority choice equilibrium in any community.
Assume, for instance, that in community 1 the majority of households chooses public
25See de la Croix and Doepke (2009), Dottori et al. (2013), Arcalean and Schiopu (2016).
26Non-emptiness requires that q2 > qˆ2, with qˆ2 ≡ q1 + xpg1 −
x
pg2
. Notice that if gross housing prices
are the same, i.e. pg1 = p
g
2, then the condition for non-emptiness reduces to q2 > q1. By contrast,
regardless of housing prices, whenever q1 ≥ q2 all households reside in community 1. Otherwise, it
could be assumed that each school district gives its population an amenity to be shared equally among
residents to guarantee that both communities are occupied.
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schooling and thus a tax rate of 1. In this scenario, richer households will be relatively
reluctant to live in this community and invest in private education for their children.
At the same time, if community 2 contains a majority of households consuming private
education, the preferred tax rate will be τ = 0. In this scenario, the majority voting
equilibrium predicts perfect schooling segregation, as well as perfect income stratifica-
tion, across communities. Moreover, note that if households choose the same tax rate in
both communities, the sorting equilibrium with majority choice could still exist because
the tax-inclusive housing price could be lower in one of the two communities.
Compared to a majority voting mechanism, probabilistic voting might promote in-
come mixing because it gives different weight to different groups of electors. Indeed,
probabilistic voting might lead to income mixing without any source of heterogeneity
other than income being introduced. This is because probabilistic voting enfranchises
agents that choose private education for their children, hence leading to a tax rate lower
than 127.
It can be shown that the equilibrium choice under probabilistic voting is equivalent
to maximizing a weighted sum of the indirect utilities of individuals28. The social welfare
functions maximized in the two communities by the political mechanism are respectively
given by:
(6) W1[τ1, q1] =
∫ x˜1
µ−σ
u[q1, 0, x, τ1, p1]f(x)dx+
∫ µ+σ
x˜2
u[0, e1, x, τ1, p1]f(x)dx
(7) W2[τ2, q2] =
∫ x˜2
x˜1
u[q2, 0, x, τ2, p2]f(x)dx
Welfare maximization is constrained to the local government budget rule of the com-
27Note that any model of tax determination that puts weight on households’ utility would tend to
have a similar effect.
28See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for further discussion.
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munity, that is:
(8) τ1
∫ x˜1
µ−σ
p1h
q
1f(x)dx+ τ1
∫ µ+σ
x˜2
p1h
e
1f(x)dx =
∫ x˜1
µ−σ
q1f(x)dx
(9) τ2
∫ x˜2
x˜1
p2h
q
2f(x)dx =
∫ x˜2
x˜1
q2f(x)dx
The left-hand side of these two constraints represents total revenues from the taxation
on housing values. The right-hand sides give the amount of total spending on public
education. Replacing households’ housing demands (4) in the balanced budget rules (8)
and (9), allows me to express the property tax rates as an increasing function of the
quality of public education:
(10) τ1[q1] =
4q1(x˜1 − µ+ σ)
2x˜21 − x˜22 − 4q1(x˜1 − µ+ σ) + 6µσ − (µ2 + σ2)
(11) τ2[q2] =
2q2
x˜1 + x˜2 − 2q2
Notice that housing prices do not directly influence the policies voted by adult resi-
dents. Moreover, the timing of events requires residential and educational choices to be
predetermined when voting occurs simultaneously in the two communities. Maximizing
the welfare functions (6) and (7) with respect to the corresponding local budget con-
straint (10) and (11), taking the first order conditions for a maximum and solving for
education quality allows the voting outcomes to be defined:
(12) q∗1 =
2x˜21 − x˜22 − (µ2 + σ2) + 6µσ
8x˜1 − 4(x˜2 + µ− 3σ)
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(13) q∗2 =
x˜1 + x˜2
4
3.1.3 Housing Market
In each community, there is a local housing market in which prices are determined
competitively. Each community has a fixed amount of homogeneous land from which
housing stock is produced through the same constant return to scale production function.
Communities can differ only in the amount of land contained within their boundaries. I
assume the existence of an absentee landlord who resides outside the economy and owns
the land29.
The aggregate housing demand in each community is obtained by integrating house-
holds’ housing demand over income interval:
(14) hd1(x, τ1, p1) =
∫ x˜1
µ−σ
hq1f(x)dx+
∫ µ+σ
x˜2
he1f(x)dx
(15) hd2(x, τ2, p2) =
∫ x˜2
x˜1
hq2f(x)dx
In equilibrium aggregate community housing demand equals community housing sup-
ply, hdi (x, τi, pi) = ki, where i = {1, 2}. For simplicity, I assume that ki represents the
total housing units in each community. Since agents have perfect foresight, they take
into account their expectations concerning the outcome of the voting process when they
formulate their housing demand. Using the equilibrium tax rates, I can derive housing
prices in the two communities as a function of income thresholds and parameters:
(16) p∗1 =
(x˜1 − x˜2 + 2σ)[2x˜21 − x˜22 + 6µσ − (µ2 + σ2)]
4k1(2x˜1 − x˜2 + 3σ − µ)
29The assumption of a fixed amount of homogeneous land, and therefore constant housing supply, is
clearly an unrealistic assumption. However, in a static model with exogenous fertility it seems reasonable
to consider the housing supply as perfectly inelastic.
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(17) p∗2 =
x˜22 − x˜21
4k2
Given x˜i, housing prices pi are decreasing in the amount of land supplied by the
Absentee Landlord in community i: the larger the supply, the lower the corresponding
housing price.
3.2 Residential Location Decisions in a Segregated Equilibrium
with Income Mixing
Before proving the existence of the income mixing equilibrium, it should be noted that a
consequence of the assumption of logarithmic preferences is that the slope of the indiffer-
ence curves of households is invariant to income. Therefore, the standard single-crossing
condition for indirect utility functions fails and the uniqueness of a widely defined equi-
librium is not guaranteed. Since the theoretical model developed in this paper is an
extension of de la Croix and Doepke (2009), my first theoretical contribution is to show
that their theoretical results hold even allowing for geographical mobility of households.
For this reason, I follow their theoretical assumptions on preferences, uniform distribu-
tion and voting. Moreover, since this paper aims principally to analyze the impact of
income inequality on public policies when households segregate by schooling, I concen-
trate on the analytical conditions that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium with
school segregation and income mixing30.
Recall that, when taking the decision on which community to live in, households
forecast public policies and that, in equilibrium, these are consistent with the policies
realized. Given economic integration across communities, each household is free to move
from one district to the other at no direct cost. As a consequence of these households’
choices, housing prices adjust endogenously. In equilibrium, no household has an in-
30Another reason why I concentrate on this type of equilibrium is that the scenario with income
segregation seems to be empirically relevant to U.S. school districts.
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centive to move, since the residential choice is the decision that maximizes the family’s
expected utility. Therefore, I concentrate my attention on the inter-community equilib-
rium, defined as follows:
Definition (Inter-community Equilibrium) An inter-community equilibrium is a
distribution of households across communities and schools, a pair of income thresholds
(x˜1; x˜2) a vector of policies (τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 , q
∗
1, q
∗
2) and housing prices (p
∗
1, p
∗
2) such that:
(i) households maximize utility with respect to housing consumption (h) and children
education (z);
(ii) the units of housing are inelastically supplied and the housing markets clear;
(iii) the regional budgets are balanced;
(iv) public education spending and property taxes are decided by a simultaneous proba-
bilistic voting mechanism in both regions;
(v) no agent wishes to move from one community to another community.
An income mixing equilibrium is an inter-community equilibrium satisfying the fol-
lowing system of equations:
(18) u[q∗1, 0, x˜1, τ
∗
1 , p
∗
1] = u[q
∗
2, 0, x˜1, τ
∗
2 , p
∗
2]
(19) u[q∗2, 0, x˜2, τ
∗
2 , p
∗
2] = u[0, e
∗[x˜2], x˜2, τ ∗1 , p
∗
1]
Equation (18) states that in equilibrium a household with income x˜1 is indifferent
between living in community 1 and sending her child to a public school of quality q∗1, or
living in community 2 and sending her child to a public school of quality q∗2. Similarly,
equation (19) implies that a household with income x˜2 is indifferent between residing in
community 1 and opting out of the public school system, or living in the other community
and sending her child to the local public school.
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Solving the system composed of equations (18) and (19) and using the equilibrium
variables (12), (13), (16), (17) allows us to determine analytically the income thresholds
x˜1 and x˜2 as a function of parameters: x˜1 = f(k1, k2, µ, σ) and x˜2 = g(k1, k2, µ, σ)
31.
Assumption 1. σ > σ¯, with σ¯ ≡ (k1+k2)µ
k1+3k2
.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 is verified. Then there exists an interior
equilibrium pair of income thresholds (x˜1; x˜2) ∈ [µ− σ, µ+ σ] such that the system com-
posed of equations (18) and (19) is satisfied and the expected quality of public education
is such that x˜1 < x˜(q1) ≤ x˜2 and x˜2 < x˜(q2).
Proof : See Appendix A.1
Proposition 1 states that if the income dispersion is sufficiently high, then there exists
an equilibrium characterized by a distribution of households across communities and
types of school in which high-income parents send their children to private schools, while
low- and middle-income parents enroll their offspring in public schools of varying quality.
In particular, all households with income x < x˜2 perfectly stratify across communities:
poor households live in community 1 while middle class households live in community 2.
Moreover, in community 1 poor and rich households cohabit and segregate themselves
by schooling.
A static model of residential location requires that no agent has an incentive to move,
that moving from one district to another cannot increase the household’s utility. Figure
1 gives a representation of the income mixing equilibrium in the space (x1, x2)
32. The
dotted (dashed) curve is the set of x1 and x2 satisfying respectively equation 18 and 19.
The intersection between the two curves determines the equilibrium values x˜1 and x˜2.
When an equilibrium with income mixing exists, it will be characterized by a popu-
lation distribution in which households with income x ∈ [µ− σ, x˜1]U [x˜2, µ+ σ] settle in
31See Appendix A.1 for the analytical expression of these thresholds.
32As an example, I set the following parameters’ values: k1 = k2 = 1, µ = 4, σ = 2.5, implying σ¯ = 2.
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Figure 1: Inter-community Equilibrium with Income Mixing
x˜1
x˜2
µ− σ
u[q∗1 , 0, x˜1, τ
∗
1 , p
∗
1] = u[q
∗
2 , 0, x˜1, τ
∗
2 , p
∗
2]
u[q∗2 , 0, x˜2, τ
∗
2 , p
∗
2] = u[0, e
∗[x2], x˜2, τ∗1 , p
∗
1]
x1
x2
community 1 and households with income x ∈ ]x˜1, x˜2[ in community 2. In this equilib-
rium communities are not perfectly stratified by income33:
(i) all households with income x ≤ x˜1 live in community 1 and send their children to a
public school of quality q1;
(ii) all households with income x˜1 < x < x˜2 live in community 2 and send their children
to a public school of quality q2;
(iii) all households with income x ≥ x˜2 live in community 1 and send their children to
private school.
Lemma 2. Define community 1 as the income mixing district and community 2 as the
pure public school district. In an income mixing equilibrium taxation and quality of
public education are higher in the pure public schooling district.
33The same result can be found in Bearse et al (2001) in a model with majority voting and indifference
curves with slope rising in income.
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Proof : Looking at the corresponding optimal tax rates it can be seen that τ ∗1 =
x˜1−µ+σ
x˜1−x˜2+2σ
and τ ∗2 = 1, with τ
∗
1 ∈]0, 1[< τ ∗2 . Since in an income mixing equilibrium µ + σ > x˜2 >
x˜1 > µ− σ > 0, it follows that q∗2 > q∗1.
Middle-income households are not able to enroll their children in private school but
they are more demanding in terms of school quality than low-income households. As
education is a normal good, they vote for a higher level of taxation and redistribution,
and settle in the pure public school district, where the resulting tax rate is the same
as that of the majority choice model. In other words, in this community probabilistic
voting generates the same result as the majority choice model because this region will
be populated only by households choosing public education for their children. By con-
trast, in community 1, parents can decide to opt out of the public system and enroll
their children in private schools. Therefore, with respect to the majority voting model,
probabilistic voting might generate income mixing and, as a result, an optimal tax rate
τ ∈]0, 1[.
Assuming that income is distributed uniformly over the interval [µ− σ;µ+ σ], I can
derive the share of households in each community and in each type of school in an income
mixing equilibrium. I define by ΨP,i and ΨR,i the fraction of children participating in
public (P) and private (R) schools respectively, in community i = {1, 2}:
(20)

ΨP,1 =
x˜1−(µ−σ)
2σ
ΨP,2 =
x˜2−x˜1
2σ
ΨR,1 =
(µ+σ)−x˜2
2σ
ΨR,2 = 0
Under perfect foresight we always obtain that the number of households with income
x ≤ x˜1 is equal to ΨP,1, those with income x˜1 < x < x˜2 is equal to ΨP,2, and those with
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income x ≥ x˜2 is equal to ΨR,1. At given x˜i, the population density in the mixed-income
community,
ΨP,1+ΨR,1
k1
= x˜1−x˜2+2σ
2k1σ
, is positively correlated with σ34.
Figure 2 graphically describes the households’ distribution in this economy, in which
rich and poor households cohabit in community 1 and send their children to different
types of school, while middle-income households live in community 2 and enroll their
children in public schools35.
Figure 2: The Economy Structure with Income Mixing
µ− σ µ+ σ
x˜1 x˜2
Community 1:public school Community 1: private school
Community 2: public school
This particular equilibrium with income mixing has already been obtained in the
literature on spatial segregation such as Nechiba (2000), Bearse et al. (2001), de Bar-
tolome and Ross (2003), Hanushek and Yilmaz (2010) and Hanushek et al. (2011). My
study differs, in that the slope of the indifference curves is invariant to income; thus
34More precisely, the societies characterized by higher income dispersion exhibit a higher ratio between
population and housing in mixed-income communities.
35In my framework, redistribution is interpreted as public education spending. Corocan and Evans
(2010) observe that the coalition of rich and poor households votes for low education spending because
rich parents prefer to opt out of public education system, while poor parents prefer higher consumption
to redistribution.
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income mixing is driven by the political mechanism behind residential sorting by school
choices and housing market. When private alternatives are available, probabilistic vot-
ing might promote income mixing because the outcome of the voting is based on the
whole distribution of residents’ preferences and not only on the median voter preference.
In other words, households have a say in taxation. Rich families would be better off by
choosing private education, since education is a normal good. Consequently, they prefer
a low level of taxation because they do not enroll their children in public schools. Poor
families, while they cannot opt out of the public system, cannot afford high taxes either.
Thus, we find high- and low-income households co-residing in the same community and
voting for a lower level of taxation than in the community in which there is no income
mixing and all residents choose public education.
Interestingly enough, the threshold σ¯ ≡ (k1+k2)µ
k1+3k2
is increasing in the mean, µ, of
the income distribution. Ceteris paribus, this means that economies with a high mean
income are less likely to be characterized by mixed-income communities. The threshold
σ¯ is also increasing in the relative dimension of communities 1 and 2, k1
k2
. The more
housing units in community 1, the greater σ needs to be in order to guarantee the
existence of this equilibrium36. When there is sufficiently low dispersion of the income
distribution, i.e. σ ≤ σ¯, households perfectly stratify by income. In this case the
fully public regime prevails. The richest group decides to reside in the community that
provides the high quality public schooling. The rest of the population lives in the other
community, enrolling their offspring in the local public school of lower quality.
Proposition 2. If σ ≤ σ¯, then x˜2 → µ + σ and ΨR,1 → 0. The resulting equilib-
rium is characterized by a fully public regime and perfect income stratification across
communities.
Proof : See Appendix A.2
36Dividing both the denominator and the numerator of σ¯ by k2, it is easy to prove that
∂σ¯
∂(k1/k2)
> 0.
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A fully public regime emerges if the income distribution is sufficiently compressed. In
this case, the threshold x˜2 coincides with the upper bound of the support of the income
distribution and no household opts out of public schooling. The reason is that parents
have more similar levels of preferred education than when there is highly dispersed
income distribution. In the fully public regime, parents do not segregate by schooling
but stratify across communities. When the fully public regime does not arise, i.e. σ > σ¯,
rich parents are more demanding in terms of education quality. In this case an income
mixing district is formed and high-income parents opt out of the public education system,
enrolling their children in private schools37.
4 Inequality, Spending on Public Schools and Resi-
dential Reallocation Choices
In this section I study the impact of inequality on the equilibrium vector of fiscal policies,
housing prices and spending on public schools, when an equilibrium with income mixing
exists. This is an interesting exercise because there is an empirical evidence of increasing
income inequality in U.S. metropolitan areas over recent decades. As in de la Croix and
Doepke (2009), I proxy inequality by higher dispersion of income distribution. Dispersion
is increased by extending the entire support of the uniform distribution, both lower
and upper bounds, by an increase in parameter σ, so as to create a mean preserving
spread. Whatever the model parameters, a mean preserving spread leads to higher
private school enrollment, lower enrollment in public schools and higher housing prices
37Differently from Martinez-Mora (2006), an urban-trap equilibrium with non-elite private schools
cannot be an equilibrium in my model. Regardless of the value of σ and parameters, the opting-out
thresholds, x˜[qi] with i = {1, 2}, are such that x˜1 < x˜[q1] ≤ x˜2 and x˜[q2] > x˜2. Therefore, private
education can be chosen only by households from the top income classes not using the high quality
public school in community 2.
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in both communities. An increase in inequality generates an effect on income thresholds
that modifies residential choices via the housing market and the voting process. However,
the effect on school quality in the mixed-income community is ambiguous and depends
on the prevailing housing market.
Proposition 3. When an equilibrium with income mixing exists, the effect of inequality
on the quality of public school q∗1 and on the income threshold x˜2 is ambiguous and
depends on the relative size of the endowment in housing:
(i) If k1
k2
≥ 1, then ∂q∗1
∂σ
< 0, ∂x˜2
∂σ
< 0, ∂x˜1
∂σ
< 0,
∂τ∗1
∂σ
< 0,
∂p∗1
∂σ
> 0,
∂q∗2
∂σ
< 0,
∂p∗2
∂σ
> 0;
(ii) If k1
k2
< 1, then there exists a unique k¯ > 0 such that:
(ii.i) if k¯ > k2 > k1, then the same results as (i) hold;
(ii.ii) if k2 > k¯ > k1, then
∂q∗1
∂σ
> 0, ∂x˜2
∂σ
> 0, ∂x˜1
∂σ
< 0,
∂τ∗1
∂σ
< 0,
∂p∗1
∂σ
> 0,
∂q∗2
∂σ
< 0,
∂p∗2
∂σ
> 0.
Proof : See Appendix A.3
When inequality increases, if housing units in community 1 are sufficiently numerous
relative to units in community 2, (cases (i) and (ii.i) in Proposition 3), both income
thresholds move to the left: households with income level x˜1 before the increase in
inequality strictly prefer to reside in district 2 and send their children to the local
public school of quality q2. By contrast, households with income x˜2 before the shock
on σ strictly prefer to reside in district 1, opt out of the public system and enroll their
children in private schools (see Figure 3). More precisely, if the relative size of the housing
market is such that the gross-of-tax housing prices in community 1 are sufficiently low, a
mean preserving spread might generate an inflow of high-income middle class households
towards this community, even though the quality of public schools is lower than in
community 2.
Due to population reallocation, the theoretical model predicts that an increase in
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inequality negatively impacts on the quality of public schooling in community 1, because
high-income middle class households migrating from community 2 will vote for low
taxation. At the same time, the quality of public schooling in community 2 is negatively
correlated with inequality. The fact that high-income households migrate to community
1 reduces the tax base, so that spending on public education decreases. Hence, the public
spending per student in community 2 will be lower following an increase in inequality.
The reason behind these results is that under the probabilistic voting mechanism, and
for sufficiently high income dispersion (σ > σ¯), the tax rate voted is lower in community
1. If following an increase in σ housing prices in community 1 are sufficiently low that the
gross-of-tax housing prices are lower than in community 2, then high-income households
might decide to reside in this community, even if the quality of its public schooling is
lower. In this case, they will opt out of public schooling, enrolling their children in private
schools. However, if housing prices in community 2 are low enough, then the opposite
applies. The fact that property taxes are lower in community 1 does not guarantee
the movement of high-income households towards community 1 as a consequence of
increasing inequality.
When inequality increases but the housing supply in community 2 is sufficiently
large compared to community 1 (case (ii.ii) in Proposition 3), the income thresholds
x˜2 move to the right, and households with this income level now strictly prefer to live
in community 2 and send their children to the local public school of quality q2. Since
housing prices and, consequently, the tax base are high in community 1, high-income
middle class households prefer to live in the other community. A mean preserving spread
makes community 1 less attractive for the richest among the middle-income households.
However, even if the tax rate goes down due to an increase in the share of rich households,
this community’s share of high-income households will be smaller than in the scenario
with lower inequality (see Figure 4).
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Figure 3: Mean-preserving Spread I
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Thanks to this population reallocation, per student spending in public education
increases in community 1 as a consequence of inequality. However, here too, inequality
negatively impacts the quality of public schooling in community 2. Given the constant
tax rate in this community, the shift in threshold x˜1 dominates the shift in threshold
x˜2, that is, the increasing share of low-income households is greater than the increasing
share of high-income households choosing public education, so that public spending per
student decreases as a consequence of a mean-preserving spread.
5 Empirical Evidence in Arizona and Illinois
The theoretical model developed in this paper contributes to the theoretical literature
by revealing a link between income inequality and the presence of income mixing school
districts. In a model where households can move across communities, the theoretical
analysis suggests that communities in which rich and poor households cohabit deliver
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Figure 4: Mean-preserving Spread II
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lower quality public schooling. This is an interesting result, as typically we would expect
the quality of public schools to be positively correlated with the local income level. One
possible reason for this result is that rich families decide to opt out of the public school
system enrolling their children in private schools and moving to another community38.
While the economic literature agrees that there is a strong and positive correlation
between income level and enrollment in private schools, the relationship between income
inequality and public schooling quality is less clear.
In this section, I provide empirical support for two theoretical conclusions of the
model developed above. First, I test the relationship between quality of public schooling
and type of school district. Second, I concentrate on the evolution of public schooling
expenditure over time. The empirical analysis draws on the school district demographic
38It should be noted that the many causes of urban segregation are vary. Using theoretical set-ups
rather different from the model developed in this paper, the literature on urban segregation has analyzed
other first-order mechanisms behind segregation patterns. For instance, Behrens et al. (2014) developed
a model of systems of cities that explains why large cities are more productive than small cities. The
model is able to replicate stylized facts about sorting, agglomeration, and selection in cities.
30
system (SDDS), a web-based source operated by the National Center for Education and
Statistics (NCES) of the U.S. Department of Education. The data are based on the
American Community Survey (ACS) 2012, 5-year estimates in 2012 inflation-adjusted
dollars. The school district funding variables are taken from the Common Core of Data
(CCD), a NCES program that annually collects fiscal and non-fiscal data about public
school districts in the United States. Details on variables and data sources are given in
Appendix B.
The empirical analysis concentrates on two particular case studies: the American
States of Arizona and Illinois. These two States were chosen not only because they
differ greatly in terms of year of founding, period of urban development, geographical
location, conformation of metropolitan area and other urban characteristics, but also
because they differ in terms of correlation between household income and total per pupil
spending on public schooling.
First, note that the data strongly support the scenario of inter-community equi-
librium described in section 3.2. Figure 5 maps the income deciles for 2000 in Cook
(Illinois) and Maricopa (Arizona) Counties, where the cities of Chicago and Phoenix
are respectively situated (5.a and 5.c)39. The maps show the existence of mixed-income
areas within unified central school districts of both cities, while the suburban school
districts seem to have a less heterogeneous income distribution within their boundaries.
Although there is a cohabitation of different income groups within central school dis-
tricts, households tend to be more stratified by income across suburb communities in
both Counties. Indeed, some communities only contain households belonging to the
same income decile.
Figure 6 shows the correlation between total public expenditure per student and
median household income by school district in Arizona (left panel) and Illinois (right
39Maps are developed with ArcGIS using the 2000 Decennial Census data and the Topologically
Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing system, TIGER. CBD refers to Central Business
District.
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Figure 5: Per Capita Income Distribution within Counties and Cities
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Figure 6: Per Pupil Expenditure and Median Household Income by School District in
Arizona and Illinois
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panel) in 2012. While in Arizona a negative correlation (-0.1431) emerges, in Illinois a
positive correlation (0.3560) is observed40.
To asses whether these two major American States feature the characteristics of
the theoretical model, I concentrate on the relationship between total expenditure per
student and median household income within school districts. The first objective of
this empirical analysis is to see whether the theoretical prediction of the emergence of
mixed-income communities is observable from school district data. To this end, the
analysis concentrates on estimation results for these States with differing school district
composition and characteristics. The unit of population considered for the analysis is
households with at least one child under 1841.
40Both correlations are significantly different from zero. Using median family income rather than
median household income generates a stronger correlation with the total expenditure per student in
both U.S. States.
41Households are defined here as having at least one child under 18 so as to avoid potential income
mixing generated by high-income households without children. Taking as unit of reference married
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I discriminate between poor, rich and middle-income households by setting a thresh-
old on household income. Since the U.S. Census Bureau does not have an official defini-
tion for middle class, I consider middle-income households those with an income higher
than $15000 but lower than $75000 per year42. Therefore, the poor are households with
an income lower than $15000 per year while the rich those with an income higher than
$75000 per year. In terms of percentile, this categorization defines as poor (respectively
rich) a household (male or female householder with at least one child under 18) rep-
resenting approximately the 15th (respectively the 85th) percentile of the U.S. income
distribution in 2012.
I then compute the share of the relevant population at State level of aggregation
belonging to each category. The percentage of households with at least one child under
18 in each income group for Arizona (Illinois) are the following: poor 13.45% (9.24%),
middle income 61.32% (43.64%) and rich 25.23% (47.12%)43. To give empirical support
to Proposition 1, I first concentrate on the relationship between population composition
in terms of income groups and proportion of private schooling. In particular, I analyze
the relationship between the share of the population in the middle class group and the
share of enrollment in private schools. The correlation coefficient between the proportion
of middle class households and private schooling is negative in both States: −0.0642 for
Arizona and −0.2547 for Illinois. Linear regression results indicate significance at the
1% level: −2.61[0.010] for Arizona, and −7.43[0.001] for Illinois44. This simple empirical
families with at least one child under 18 does not change the qualitative results of this empirical
analysis.
42The Census Bureau provides the poverty thresholds for 2012 by size of family and number of related
children under 18. The threshold for a family of two people with a householder under 65 and a child
under 18 is $15825. Thompson and Hickey (2005) claim that the working class income ranges from
$16000 to $25000 and the lower middle class income from $35000 to $75000.
43Considering that in Arizona the median household income derived from the ACS data is $50256,
and in Illinois $56853, it seems reasonable to use the same threshold for both States. If for Illinois I
define as middle class households with income between $15.000 and $100.000, I derive the following
percentage for middle class and rich: 57.92% and 32.84%, respectively. Notice that if, for Illinois, I
consider as rich households whose income is higher than $100000, the qualitative results of the analysis
do not change.
44The p-values for the test are reported in square brackets.
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exercise sheds light on one of the theoretical implications of the model developed in this
paper: the relationship between the share of the population in the middle class group
and the share of private schooling is negative.
The next step in providing support for Proposition 1 is to show that the quality of
public education is lower in income mixing communities than in communities occupied
by middle-income households choosing to enroll their children in public schools. To this
end, each school district needs to be characterized within the two relevant categories of
the model: mixed-income and middle-income school districts. I therefore compute the
ratio between the share of rich, poor and middle-income households within each school
district and the share at State level. To distinguish the districts that are relatively
homogeneous from those that are heterogeneous in terms of income, I consider a mixed-
income school district as a particular district in which the share of poor and rich families
is larger than the corresponding share at State level and the ratio between rich and poor,
or poor and rich respectively, is at most 1 to 345. Then, I define as a potentially middle-
income district any district where the above ratio for middle class is higher than 1. To be
consistent with the theoretical model in which a middle-income school district is defined
as a pure public school district, I assume another condition before a school district can
be considered a middle-income district: the share of enrollment in private primary and
secondary education has to be smaller than 0.1%.
From the data set I exclude the districts for which the Census does not provide
financial data. This leaves the new data set with 207 observations over 220 public
school districts in Arizona, and 857 observations over 881 public school districts in
Illinois. Public education quality is measured by current total per pupil spending by the
public elementary-secondary school system and total per pupil instruction expenditure.
45In order to characterize the residual non-middle-income district, this restriction is a reasonable
assumption, even though it has no theoretical foundation in the paper. A sharper restriction, for
instance 1 to 2, would not provide categories relevant for Illinois. However, for the state of Arizona is
possible to consider sharper conditions. Note that even for a larger restriction, for example 1 to 4, the
results will be qualitatively the same.
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Table 1: Estimation results: regression of public school expenditure on school district
indicators
Arizona Illinois
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Middle income 2.17∗∗ 2.73∗∗∗ -0.11 -0.83
(0.031) (0.007) (0.909) (0.409)
Mixed Income -2.11∗∗ -1.88∗ 0.38 -0.70
(0.036) (0.062) (0.706) (0.481)
Constant 9558.56 5038.28 11077.85 6464.63
Hypothesis test:
H0: Dummymix=Dummymid 12.71 15.35 0.13 0.00
[0.0005]∗∗∗ [0.0001]∗∗∗ [0.7187] [0.9598]
Observations 207 207 857 857
Notes: The dependent variables are total expenditure per pupil (1) and instruction expen-
diture per pupil (2). Coefficients for the control variables (described in the text) are not
reported. The constants are expressed in dollars. Dummymix and Dummymid describe the
dummy for the hypothesis test for mixed-income and middle-income school districts respec-
tively. The p-values for the test are reported in square brackets. * indicates significance at
the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance
at the 1 percent level.
Table 1 reports the results for estimates of the parameters of the regression of the
two measures of quality of public schooling on a constant and two indicators which
identify the type of school district, namely Dummymix = 1 if the district is defined
as a mixed-income school district and Dummymid = 1 if the district is defined as
a middle-income school district. The regression results for Arizona (left panel), show
that the average coefficients for total and instructional expenditure per pupil for the
school districts which do not fall within my categorization are $9558.56 and $5038.28
respectively. The average coefficients for total and instructional expenditure per pupil
in middle-income districts are both above the income of the residual category and are
$11438.31 and $6286.59 respectively. For the mixed-income districts, both are below the
average expenditure of the residual category, respectively $8154.18 and $4376.75. All the
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coefficients are individually statistically significant at standard confidence levels. Notice
that in Arizona, 32.85% of the school districts are defined as mixed income, while 15.46%
defined as middle income. Furthermore, I test the joint hypothesis that the coefficients
are not statistically different from each other. The results suggest the rejection of the
null hypothesis for both measures of public schooling quality and confirm the conclusion
of the theoretical model: mixed-income communities have lower public schooling quality,
while middle-income communities spend more on public education.
For Illinois (right panel in table 1), results are less clear. First, from my catego-
rization it emerges that the presence of mixed-income and middle-income districts only
has a marginal impact. In fact, only 3.15% can be defined as mixed-income districts.
Although larger in number, the relatively low share of middle-income districts (3.62%)
in Illinois suggests greater stratification across school districts in terms of household
income in Illinois than in Arizona. As expected, the results in table 1 do not provide
striking evidence either supporting or contradicting the theoretical model. The coeffi-
cients for the indicators of the presence of mixed-income or middle-income districts are
both individually insignificant at standard confidence level for both schooling quality
measures.
In the end, I focus on the evolution of public schooling quality over time in Ari-
zona, the case study providing a good fit with the theoretical set-up developed in the
previous section. Seeking theoretical support for Proposition 3, this empirical exercise
concentrates on the effect of an increase in inequality on public schooling quality in
mixed-income and middle-income school communities. Here, I use CCD data for years
2003/2004 and 2010/2011 with the ELSi application46. Income levels over time are com-
pared using the U.S. Government CPI data47. Furthermore, the 1-year ACS data on
46The table was created using the Elementary/Secondary Information System (ELSi).
47Using CPI data it is possible to calculate the inflation rate and the buying power of the dollar over
time. To compare income in 2004 with income in 2011, the 2004 data have to be inflation-adjusted by
1.19%.
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Table 2: Public Schooling Quality Variation in Arizona
Public School Quality 2004 - 2011
District ∆ per pupil ∆% per pupil ∆ instruction ∆% instruction
Mixed -389.69 -9.24% -616.60 -20.82%
Middle -1311.18 -19.61% -628.21 -21.65%
Average -636.09 -11.88% -597.79 -20.41%
Notes: ∆ define the mean variation from year 2004 to year 2011. The first and
third columns are expressed in dollars. The second and the fourth columns provide
mean percentage variations.
household income in Arizona show a Gini index increase from 0.448 in 2004 to 0.460 in
201148.
Using ACS data provided by the NCES, I first derive the ratio between housing
units per household with at least one child in the mixed-income and middle-income
school districts previously defined. Then, I calculate the ratio between housing units
and households in mixed-income and middle-income districts at aggregate level, that is
k1
k2
= 1.957
1.311
. This ratio is 1.493. Proposition 3 predicts a reduction in public schooling
quality in both types of school district when inequality increases. To check this, I
compare the data on per pupil spending, total and instructional, for the two periods of
reference in both mixed-income and middle-income school districts at aggregate level.
Table 2 summarizes the main stylized facts emerging for the State of Arizona.
As expected, the data point to a reduction of the inflation-adjusted per pupil and
instructional public expenditure on Arizona public schools49. In other words, an in-
crease in inequality in the period 2004 - 2011 was accompanied by a reduction in public
schooling quality in both mixed-income and middle-income communities.
The case study on Arizona provides a good fit with the theoretical set-up developed
48The ACS 2004 data only provide the Gini index for 80 districts. For this reason the variation in
the Gini index is considered at State level of aggregation and not by type of school district.
49The Joint Legislative Budget Committee Staff Memorandum (2012) estimates a decrease in
inflation-adjusted per pupil expenditure in Arizona public schools of 15.1% from 2008 to 2013. Along
these lines, Hunting (2013) observes that State funding for K-12 education in Arizona fell by 21%
between 2002 and 2011.
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in this paper. The data suggest a negative correlation between household median income
and quality of public schooling in Arizona. This may be because the geographical mobil-
ity of households and the presence of mixed-income communities have an impact on the
policy adopted by different school districts. Moreover, the results indicate a negative ef-
fect of inequality on public education spending in both mixed- and middle-income school
districts. However, deeper empirical analysis would be necessary to determine whether
this evidence is primarily due to schooling choices and residential location decisions.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I developed a general equilibrium model on residential sorting which points
to mixed-income communities within school districts rather than perfect income strati-
fication across communities. With respect to the previous literature, my model includes
simultaneously: public versus private education choice, a two-community structure with
independent local government, a competitive housing market within each community, a
property tax rate based on housing value rather than income tax, a probabilistic voting
mechanism and endogenous residential choices. The theoretical framework can be used
to study the relationship between income distribution and residential decisions.
The first prediction of this model with probabilistic voting is that, in highly unequal
economies in which households segregate by schooling within communities, poor and
rich households cohabit in the same community and send their children respectively to
public and private schools. In contrast, middle-income households reside in the other
community and choose the local public school for their children. However, households
stratify by income across communities in less unequal economies.
More importantly, the model predicts that the effect of inequality on residential loca-
tion decisions and, therefore, on public spending per student, is ambiguous, and depends
on the relative endowments of housing in the two communities. An increase in inequal-
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ity leads to an influx of middle-income households to the mixed-income district when
the supply of housing is sufficiently large. The housing market is crucial in this frame-
work, since its characteristics affect residential choices and may imply an endogenous
population reallocation within the communities.
The theoretical results presented in this paper highlight issues that point to pos-
sible directions for further empirical research. First, they suggest that the correlation
between quality of public schooling and local income level is not necessarily positive.
Second, inequality may have a strong impact on residential decisions and public school
investments in cities with differing urban development patterns. Third, school choice
could be, among others, one of the key mechanisms driving segregation patterns.
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A Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting (4), (10), (11), (12), (13), (16) and (17) into the system composed of
equations (18) and (19) and solving simultaneously at the equilibrium, allows us to
determine the income thresholds that leave households indifferent between living in
community 1 or in community 2:
x˜1 =
α + 2β
2k2(k1 + k2)
x˜2 =
α + β
k2(2k1 + k2)
with α =
√
(k1 + k2)2 [k21(µ− 3σ)2 + 32k1k2σ2 + 16k22σ2] + k21(µ− 3σ) + 3k1k2(µ− 3σ),
and β = k22µ − 3k22σ. The solution of the system composed of equations (18) and
(19) is an interior, µ + σ > x˜2 > x˜1 > µ − σ > 0, if and only if assumption 1 holds
µ > σ > (k1+k2)µ
k1+3k2
≡ σ¯. In this income mixing equilibrium, both no-migration conditions
(18) and (19) are simultaneously satisfied and no agent has an incentive to move because
utilities are maximized and housing markets clear.
Lemma 1 establishes that the distribution of households across education sectors ex-
hibits perfect income segregation within a particular location. In particular, all house-
holds with income x > x˜[q] strictly prefer private education for their children. To
formally prove the existence of an income mixing equilibrium in this economy, we need
to check if boundary indifference holds. First, consider the case of an agent with in-
come level x living in community 1 and choosing public schooling. This agent has
no incentive to move if her/his utility level is strictly greater than the utility of the
agent that is indifferent between living in community 1 or in community 2 when choos-
ing public schooling, i.e. the agent with income x˜1. Using (18), we have to check
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if u[q∗1, 0, x, τ
∗
1 , p
∗
1] > u[q
∗
2, 0, x˜1, τ
∗
2 , p
∗
2] = u[q
∗
1, 0, x˜1, τ
∗
1 , p
∗
1]. Using the indirect utility
function defined by (5), we observe that in equilibrium the above inequality is veri-
fied when ln
(
− 4k1x
µ2−6µσ+σ2−2x2+x˜22
)
− ln
(
− 4k1x˜1
µ2−6µσ+σ2−2x˜21+x˜22
)
+ ln
(
−µ2−6µσ+σ2−2x2+x˜22
8x−4(µ−3σ+x˜2)
)
−
ln
(
−µ2−6µσ+σ2−2x˜21+x˜22
8x˜1−4(µ−3σ+x˜2)
)
> 0. Taking the exponential function, given the optimal income
threshold x˜2 and assumption 1, we find that
x(8x˜1−4(µ−3σ+x2))
x˜1(8x−4(µ−3σ+x˜2)) > 1 for any x < x˜1. The
utility level for an agent with income level x living in community 1 and choosing public
schooling is strictly greater than the utility level of the indifferent agent with income x˜1
living in community 1 or in community 2 and choosing public schooling when x < x˜1.
The equilibrium also requires that the utility level of an agent with income x living
in community 2 and choosing public schooling be larger than the utility of the agent
indifferent between living in community 1 and choosing private education or living in
community 2 and choosing public education. Using (19), we want to prove that in
equilibrium u[q∗2, 0, x, τ
∗
2 , p
∗
2] > u[0, e
∗[x˜2], x˜2, τ ∗1 , p
∗
1] = u[q
∗
2, 0, x˜2, τ
∗
2 , p
∗
2]. This condition
is verified when ln
(
2k2x
x2−x˜21
)
− ln
(
2k2x˜2
x˜22−x˜21
)
+ ln(x + x˜1) − ln(x˜1 + x˜2) > 0. Taking the
exponential function, we observe that the above condition holds whenever x(x˜2−x˜1)
(x−x˜1)x˜2 > 1,
that is, when x < x˜2. At the same time, using the previous part of the proof, it is
straightforward that the utility of the agent with income x is larger than the utility of
the indifferent agent with income x˜1 choosing public education and community 1 when
x > x˜1. Therefore, both inequalities simultaneously hold when x˜2 > x > x˜1.
Finally, in equilibrium the utility of an agent with income x living in region 1 and
choosing private education must be strictly greater than the utility of the agent with
income x˜2 indifferent between choosing public education and living in community 2 or
choosing private education but living in community 1. Using (19), we want to verify
that u[0, e∗[x], x, τ ∗1 , p
∗
1] > u[q
∗
2, 0, x˜2, τ
∗
2 , p
∗
2] = u[0, e
∗[x˜2], x˜2, τ ∗1 , p
∗
1]. Proceeding as in the
previous step of the proof, an agent choosing private schooling and living in community
1 will never move if ln
(
− 2k1x2
µ2−6µσ+σ2+x2−2x˜21
)
− ln
(
− 2k1x˜22
µ2−6µσ+σ2−2x˜21+x˜22
)
> 0. Taking the
42
exponential function, this condition reduces to
x2(µ2−6µσ+σ2−2x˜21+x˜22)
x˜22(µ2−6µσ+σ2+x2−2x˜21)
> 1 and is verified
when x > x˜2.
The solution of the system composed of equations (18) and (19) is an interior. An
income mixing equilibrium emerges and is stable if and only if µ > σ > (k1+k2)µ
k1+3k2
≡ σ¯ so
that µ+ σ > x˜2 > x˜1 > µ− σ > 0 and no agent wishes to move. The condition reduces
to µ
2
< σ < µ if we consider equal numbers of housing units in the two communities,
that is k1 = k2 = k¯.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Use the threshold x˜2 defined in proof 1. Equation x˜2 is continuous in σ. The limit of x˜2
when σ → σ¯ ≡ (k1+k2)µ
k1+3k2
is equal to −2k1µ(k
2
1+3k1k2+k
2
2)+2(k1+3k2)
k2(2k1+k2)(k1+3k2)
√
µ2(k1+k2)2(k21+4k1k2+2k22)
2
(k1+3k2)2
.
Given the parameters, this limit belongs to the domain [µ − σ;µ + σ] if and only if
σ > σ¯. If σ = σ¯ then x˜2 = µ+ σ. Moreover, the limit of ΨR,1 when σ → σ¯ is zero since
x˜2 → µ + σ. When σ < σ¯ we can observe that x˜2 > µ + σ. This scenario is excluded
since x˜2 is outside the domain of the income distribution.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
First, derive the sign of the derivatives of the residential thresholds x˜1 and x˜2 with
respect to σ. Using the income thresholds defined in appendix A.1, we want to show
that ∂x˜1
∂σ
< 0, ∀ki > 0. This inequality holds when a+ 3b
√
c > 0, with a = 3k21(µ−3σ)−
32k1k2σ−16k22σ, b = k1+2k2 and c = k21(µ−3σ)2+32k1k2σ2+16k22σ2. Notice that a < 0,
b > 0 and c > 0. Taking the square of a + 3b
√
c > 0, after some algebra, we find that
∂x˜1
∂σ
< 0 when 4k2(176k1k
2
2σ
2+80k32σ
2+k31(9µ
2−6µσ+9σ2)+k21k2(9µ2−30µσ+77σ2)) > 0.
Since 9µ2 − 6µσ + 9σ2 > 0 and 9µ2 − 30µσ + 77σ2 > 0 for µ > σ > 0, it follows that
∂x˜1
∂σ
< 0 ∀ki > 0.
The sign of the derivative ∂x˜2
∂σ
is not monotonic in σ and depends on the relative size
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of the housing endowment in the two communities, k1 and k2.
∂x˜2
∂σ
= −
e+ ad√
cd
f
where d = (k1 + k2)
2, e = 3k21 + 9k1k2 + 3k
2
2 and f = k2(2k1 + k2).
Notice that d, e, f > 0. We have to study the sign of the numerator e + ad√
cd
. After
some algebra, the numerator is positive if
2k21+4k1k2−7k22
(k1+k2)2
+
16k21µ
2
k21(µ−3σ2)+32k1k2σ2+16k22σ2 > 0.
When k1 > k2 the latter is positive. It follows that
∂x˜2
∂σ
< 0.
When k2 > k1 the algebra becomes more complicated. We can construct the proof
using the limit of the derivatives. The limit of ∂x˜2
∂σ
when k2 → 0 is equal to −∞ and the
limit of ∂x˜2
∂σ
when k2 → ∞ is equal to 4
√
σ2
σ
− 3. Since this derivative is continuous and
increasing in k2 within the domain, it must cross the x-axis only once, when k2 = k¯.
The sign of the derivative ∂q1
∂σ
reflects the behavior of ∂x˜2
∂σ
. In particular, we can
observe that if ∂x˜2
∂σ
> 0 then ∂q1
∂σ
> 0 and vice-versa. The derivative ∂q1
∂σ
is equal to
−3µ
√
(k2+1)2((16k2(k2+2)+9)σ2+µ2−6µσ)−3(k2(k2+3)+1)µ2+18(k2(k2+3)+1)µσ
4k2(k2+2)((16k2(k2+2)+9)σ2+µ2−6µσ)
+
(16k2(k2+2)+9)σ
(√
(k2+1)2((16k2(k2+2)+9)σ2+µ2−6µσ)−3(k2(k2+3)+1)σ
)
4k2(k2+2)((16k2(k2+2)+9)σ2+µ2−6µσ)
Assume for simplicity that k1 = 1. The limit of
∂q1
∂σ
when k2 → 0 is equal to −∞
and the limit of ∂q1
∂σ
when k2 → ∞ is equal to
√
σ2
σ
− 3
4
> 0. Since this derivative is
continuous and increasing in k2 within the domain, it must cross the x-axis only once,
when k2 = k¯. Numerically, k¯ is the threshold for both
∂x˜2
∂σ
= 0 and ∂q1
∂σ
= 0, and this
is true for all possible parameter values. Set for instance µ = 3 and σ = 1. We get
∂x˜2
∂σ
= 0 iff k2 = 1.65181. At the same time we get
∂q1
∂σ
= 0 iff k2 = 1.65181. Set for
instance µ = 3.5 and σ = 2. Both derivatives, ∂x˜2
∂σ
and ∂q1
∂σ
, are zero iff k2 = 1.23508. If
k2 is smaller than this threshold value, then the signs of the derivatives
∂x˜2
∂σ
and ∂q1
∂σ
are
negative, otherwise they are non-negative.
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Let us now study the derivative of ∂τ1
∂σ
= 0, that is, −g(
√
cd+k21(µ−3σ)+k1k2(µ−3σ))
k2
√
cd(h+
√
cd)
2 = 0,
with g = 8k21(k1 + k2)
2(2k1 + k2)µ and h = k1k2(µ− 15σ) + k21(µ− 11σ)− 4k22σ. As the
denominator is always positive, in order to prove that the optimal tax rate in community
1 is negatively correlated with σ, it is sufficient to show that
√
cd + k21(µ − 3σ) +
k1k2(µ− 3σ) > 0 since g > 0. After some algebraical manipulations, we can derive that
√
cd+ k21(µ− 3σ) + k1k2(µ− 3σ) = 6k2(k1 + k2)2(2k1 + k2)σ2 > 0.
To study the sign of the derivative ∂q2
∂σ
=
∂x˜1
∂σ
+
∂x˜2
∂σ
4
, we have first to derive the intensity
of a variation in σ on the thresholds when σ increases. Using the previous results we can
observe that the effect of σ on threshold x˜1 is always greater than the effect on threshold
x˜2. Under assumption 1 we always observe that
∣∣∂x˜1
∂σ
∣∣ > ∣∣∂x˜2
∂σ
∣∣. Therefore, ∂q2
∂σ
< 0 also
when threshold x˜2 moves to the right.
Now we have to show that inequality is positively correlated with housing prices in
both communities. From equation (17) we know that p2 =
x˜22−x˜21
4k2
, so that the derivative
∂p2
∂σ
=
x˜2
∂x˜2
∂σ
−x˜1 ∂x˜1∂σ
2k2
. Since ∂x˜1
∂σ
< 0 ∀ki, if k¯ > k2 > k1, then ∂x˜2∂σ > 0. It follows directly
that x˜2
∂x˜2
∂σ
− x˜1 ∂x˜1∂σ > 0 and consequently ∂p2∂σ > 0. When ∂x˜2∂σ < 0 we can observe that
x˜2
x˜1
=
∂x˜1
∂σ
∂x˜2
∂σ
for σ = σ¯. Since
∣∣∂x˜1
∂σ
∣∣ > ∣∣∂x˜2
∂σ
∣∣, it follows from continuity that x˜2 ∂x˜2∂σ > x˜1 ∂x˜1∂σ if
σ > σ¯. Under Assumption 1 we observe that
∂p∗2
∂σ
> 0. The same argument can be used
to prove that
∂p∗1
∂σ
> 0, ∀ σ > σ¯.
B Data Appendix
The data by school district on household income, public and private enrollment, housing
units, Gini index are taken from the 2012 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year
estimates released in September 2013. Compared to the 1-year and 3-year estimates,
the 5-year estimates contain data on small geographies. Data are collected using the
school district demographic system (SDDS), a web-based source operated by the Na-
tional Center for Education Statistics (NCES) of the U.S. Department of Education.
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Districts are divided into elementary, high school and unified (for Arizona) or unit (for
Illinois) school districts. The SDDS collects data for all children under 18 years of age
and not high school graduates (ages 18-19). Household income data are divided into 16
income brackets and family type is determined by presence of children under 18 years.
Income for the past 12 months is calculated in 2012 inflation-adjusted dollars. Per pupil
current spending for the public elementary-secondary system and instructional expendi-
ture are taken from the financial survey of school system finances. Although the Census
also provides data for funding variables for 2010, since the income levels are defined in
2012 inflation-adjusted dollars, I use 2012 data for funding variables. The data for the
analysis in table 2 were obtained with the Elsi application from the Common Core of
Data (CCD) and Private School Survey (PSS) for years 2003/2004 and 2010/2011.
C Robustness Check: Bounded Pareto Distribution
In this appendix, I assume that income is distributed according to a bounded Pareto
distribution with probability density function (p.d.f.), f(x) =
αxαminx
−α−1
1−( xminxmax )
α , cumulative
density function (c.d.f.), F (x) =
1−xαminx−α
1−( xminxmax )
α , support 0 < xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax and parameter
α > 2. The mean is given by: µ =
xαmin
1−( xminxmax )
α
(
α
α−1
) (
1
xα−1min
− 1
xα−1max
)
. The bounded
Pareto distribution is chosen for two reasons. First, analytical tractability: unlike other
similar income distributions, such as the unbounded Pareto distribution or log-normal
distribution, this income distribution allows me to derive an analytical formulation for
both voted policies τ ∗1 and τ
∗
2 and, therefore, public education spending q
∗
1 and q
∗
2.
Moreover, using this particular income distribution, I am able to illustrate the main
mechanism of the theoretical model as well as to compare the main results with the
predictions of the model with a uniform distribution. Second, the Pareto distribution is
a relatively good approximation of the actual US income distribution, in particular for
the upper tail of the income distribution.
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It is straightforward to demonstrate that, in this scenario too, the opting-out thresh-
old is the one defined by Lemma 1. Moreover, given the timing of events, private
consumption decisions would not be affected by the type of income distribution. What
would be affected are the policies adopted and, therefore, public education spending.
Since the objective of this appendix is to show the existence of an equilibrium with in-
come mixing, we concentrate on the particular case in which both districts are occupied
and private education is provided in community 1.
Assume for simplicity that p1 = p2 = 1 and that k1 = k2 = 1. The government
budget constraints are balanced when in both regions the collected tax revenues are
equal to the total public education spending. In region 2:
τ2
1 + τ2
∫ x˜2
x˜1
xf(x)dx = q2
∫ x˜2
x˜1
f(x)dx
Observe that
∫ x˜2
x˜1
f(x)dx =
(x˜−α1 −x˜−α2 )xαmin
1−( xminxmax )
α and
∫ x˜2
x˜1
f(x)dx =
α(x˜1−α2 −x˜1−α1 )xαmin
(1−α)(1−( xminxmax )
α
)
. It follows
that:
q2[τ2] =
τ2
1 + τ2
α(x˜α1 x˜2 − x˜1x˜α2 )
(1− α)(x˜α2 − x˜α1 )
Using the social welfare function defined by (7) and the government budget constraint
defined above, we can derive the tax rate voted in region 2 when income is distributed
according to a bounded Pareto distribution: τ ∗2 = 1. Not surprisingly, the optimal tax
rate is the same as in the benchmark case with uniform distribution of income. Unlike
the benchmark case, public education spending is given by:
q∗2 =
α(x˜α1 x˜2 − x˜1x˜α2 )
2(1− α)(x˜α2 − x˜α1 )
In region 1, parents can decide to opt out of the public school system by enrolling
their children in private schools. The local government budget rule for this community
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is given by the following equation:
τ1
1 + τ1
(∫ x˜1
xmin
xf(x)dx+
1
2
∫ xmax
x˜2
xf(x)dx
)
= q1
∫ x˜1
xmin
f(x)dx
Observe that:
∫ x˜1
xmin
f(x)dx =
1−x˜−α1 xαmin
1−( xminxmax )
α ,
∫ x˜1
xmin
xf(x)dx =
αx˜−α1 (xminx˜α1−xαminx˜1)
(α−1)(1−( xminxmax )
α
)
and∫ xmax
x˜2
xf(x)dx =
axαmin(x
1−α
max−x˜1−α2 )
(α−1)(1−( xminxmax )
α
)
. Proceeding as for region 2, we define the local gov-
ernment budget constraint as follows:
q1[τ1] =
ατ1x˜
−α
2 x
−α
max (x˜
α
1 (x˜
α
2 (2xminx
α
max − xmaxxαmin) + x˜2xαmaxxαmin)− 2x˜1x˜α2xαmaxxαmin)
2(α− 1)(1 + τ1) (x˜α1 − xαmin)
Adapting the social welfare function (6) to the case of a bounded Pareto distribution
with support 0 < xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax and using the government budget constraint defined
above, we can derive the tax rate voted in region 1:
τ ∗1 =
x˜1 − xmin
x˜1 − x˜2 + xmax − xmin
First of all, notice that 0 < τ ∗1 < τ
∗
2 = 1. Both districts are occupied if and only if q
∗
2 > q
∗
1.
Therefore, when an equilibrium with income mixing exists, it will be characterized by
a distribution of households across communities and types of school as described by
proposition 1. Unlike the scenario with uniform distribution, using a bounded Pareto
distribution means we cannot obtain analytical solutions for the no-migration thresholds
x˜1 and x˜2.
A numerical exercise shed light on the properties of this particular equilibrium when
income is distributed according to a bounded Pareto distribution. Assume that xmin =
0.1, xmax = 1 and α = 20 so that µ = 0.105263. Using the no-migration conditions
defined by (18) and (19) and the voted policies derived in this appendix, we derive:
x˜1 = 0.351329 and x˜2 = 0.549127. Substituting these thresholds in the voted policies
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and in public education spending allows us to derive: τ ∗1 = 0.357915, q
∗
1 = 0.0277449
and q∗2 = 0.184896. A mean preserving spread can be obtained by assuming a negative
variation of parameter α and the lower bound xmin, such that the mean of the income
distribution, µ, does not change. As in the main text, we approximate an increase in
inequality with a mean-preserving spread. Assume, for instance, that α decreases by
0.5%, that is, from α = 20 to α = 19.9. To maintain a constant mean at µ = 0.105263,
the lower bound xmin has to decrease to xmin = 0.099973. Solving the no-migration
conditions using these parameters, we observe that both thresholds move to the left:
x˜1 = 0.312263 and x˜2 = 0.38112853. Since we have assumed p1 = p2 = 1 and that
k1 = k2 = 1, the expected effect from increased inequality on public education spending
would be negative in both regions, as suggested by proposition 3, part i. Using these
no-migration conditions: τ ∗1 = 0.25538, q
∗
1 = 0.0214135 and q
∗
2 = 0.163674. As expected,
inequality negatively impacts the quality of public schooling in both communities.
Even though this numerical exercise has no general validity, it indicates that an equi-
librium with income mixing can also exist when assuming a bounded Pareto distribution.
Moreover, it suggests that inequality can have a negative impact on public education
quality, as shown in the paper assuming a standard uniform income distribution.
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